Samuel von Pufendorf; Isaac Newton; Bernard Mandeville; Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury; Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu; and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. But, with some exceptions, they tend to receive only brief characterization: enough to set the scene for their Scottish interlocutors, but not enough either (1) to de-center Scotland by drawing attention to the genuinely transnational elements of the debates in which the Scots were intervening (as some similar handbooks do), or (2) to demonstrate the specifically Scottish character of their positions by contrast with those of non-Scots. Rather, most of the thematically-oriented chapters base their general claims about Scottish authors on a comparative analysis of Scottish texts. That said, those claims often involve asserting the heterogeneity of Scottish positions on the theme in question (as in, for example, Emma Macleod's chapter on "revolution"). In other words, the volume's attitude toward the sometimes nationalist project to identify a characteristically Scottish philosophical tradition (assessed in Paul Wood's historiographical postscript) is probably best described not as hard-edged defense but rather as circumspect acceptance.
S A good example is Williams's illuminating discussion of Sellars's theory of truth as semantic assertibility (i.e. truth as assertibility according to idealized, epistemic rules), which is anchored in the world by a (controversial) theory of picturing that eschews semantic relations in favor of isomorphisms in the causal order between language episodes considered as natural objects, and other worldly entities. Under Williams's scrutiny, this position is found to be inferior to contemporary deflationist and minimalist theories as a means for carrying out Sellars's inferentialist program. It is to Williams's credit that he goes beyond programmatic statements to give some details on what concrete inferential role explications of the truth predicate and causal, law-like, claims could look like. But even here we are still left with an explication that features a placeholder for a future more adequate account, because supplying semantic clauses is not Williams's primary concern.
Another good example, on the opposite side of the spectrum, is the self-proclaimed "renegade daughter," Ruth Millikan, who likewise challenges Sellars's picture theory along with other aspects of the Kantian-Wittgensteinian structure of language and thought that Sellars wants to integrate with the scientific image. At the heart of their dispute is the issue of whether the constitutive norms take a prescriptive form. Millikan does not say so directly, but the conflict seems to concern whether agent responsibility-and appraising uses of norms (see Florian Steinberger, "Three ways in which logic might be normative," forthcoming), where ought-to-be rules of criticism open the speaker up to questions and challenges-plays b o o k r e v i e w s a constitutive role for language and thought. Moreover, Millikan and Sellars disagree about whether the naturalized implementation should take place at the psychological (and perhaps sociological) or biological level of description. As Millikan emphasizes, the inferentialist account of socially instituted norms, and her competing conception of norms based on the "proper functions" of language forms for which they were naturally selected (see Millikan, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, 1984) , have opposing implications for the account of language acquisition. Indeed, Millikan suspects that Sellars's program rests on "a largely false empirical assumption about the nature of language and thought, that is, on a mistake at the level of theoretical linguistics and psychology" (122).
As someone who conducts psychological experiments on a local, inferentialist account of conditionals (see Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer, "The Relevance Effect and Conditionals," 2016; "Relevance and Reason Relations," 2016), I would applaud if the empirical consequences of these opposing views were spelled out across a broad range of topics in cognitive science (e.g. language acquisition, compositionality, categorization, concept-formation, linguistic and non-linguistic thought, reasoning tasks, the cognitive evaluation of sentences).
To be sure, Seibt's chapter features a rich discussion of Sellars's views in the light of recent developments in embodied cognitive science that goes in the right direction. However, if our goal were to make the philosophical theories from above useful for scientific purposes, then we would ultimately need to spell out their unique and hard to vary predictions, as argued in chapter one of Olsen (Making Ranking Theory Useful for Psychology of Reasoning, 2014) . Now more than twenty years have passed since Sellars's inferentialist theory of meaning received a comprehensive elaboration in Brandom (Making it Explicit, 1994) . It would therefore benefit the debate if more concrete explications of the inferential role of particular linguistic expressions were given (after Williams's role model, but without placeholders and promissory notes), and if the empirical implications were made explicit. This would enable us to decide which of the two descendants of Sellars that we have looked at provides the best account of linguistic competence.
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